Investor expectations of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis: Applying the Bates model to modern Stock Market events by Kitchens, Eric Gene
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current Honors College
Spring 2014
Investor expectations of the 2007-2009 Financial
Crisis: Applying the Bates model to modern Stock
Market events
Eric Gene Kitchens
James Madison University
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior
Honors Projects, 2010-current by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kitchens, Eric Gene, "Investor expectations of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis: Applying the Bates model to modern Stock Market
events" (2014). Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current. 438.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/438
Investor Expectations of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis: Applying the Bates Model to Modern 
Stock Market Events 
_______________________ 
 
A Project Presented to 
 
the Faculty of the Undergraduate 
 
College of Business 
 
James Madison University 
_______________________ 
 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
for the Degree of Bachelor of Science 
_______________________ 
 
by Eric Gene Kitchens 
 
May 2014 
 
 
 
Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Finance, James Madison University, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Science. 
 
FACULTY COMMITTEE: 
 
 
       
Project Advisor:  Jason Fink, Ph.D., 
Eminent Professor, Finance 
 
 
       
Reader:  Kristin Fink, Ph.D., 
Professor, Finance 
 
 
       
Reader:  Elias Semaan, Ph.D., 
Associate Professor, Finance 
HONORS PROGRAM APPROVAL: 
 
 
       
Barry Falk, Ph.D., 
Director, Honors Program 
 2 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements 3 
Abstract 4 
Introduction 5 
Option Pricing Models 11 
Estimation 21 
Results 25 
Discussion 30 
Conclusion 34 
Appendix A: Figures 35 
Appendix B: Tables 53 
Appendix C: Matlab Code 55 
References 65 
 
 3 
Acknowledgements 
 I would like to thank Dr. Jason Fink, without whom I would not have been able to 
explore my potential and academic curiosities. His patience, tutelage, guidance, and influence 
have been invaluable to me and to this project. My experience at James Madison would not have 
been the same without you.  
 I would also like to thank my readers, Dr. Kristin Fink and Dr. Elias Semaan, for their 
feedback, support, and enthusiasm. Thank you each for being excited and engaged in the spirit 
and content of this project from the proposal to the final draft. 
 I would like to thank Dr. Barry Falk and the Honors Program, which provided substantial 
aid for purchasing the data necessary for my research with an Honors Program Small Grant 
award. Thank you to Dr. Pamela Drake and the Finance Department for also contributing 
significant funds for the data.  
 Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and coworkers for their continuous 
understanding and flexibility. To my wife, Katie, thank you for allowing me to vent, think aloud, 
rant excitedly, and stay on task. I could not have done this without you. 
 4 
Abstract 
Following the financial crisis of 2007-2009, many analysts argued that market insiders 
should have anticipated the crisis. We update and apply the Bates (1991) method to see if 
investors anticipated a stock market crash during this period. S&P 500 options prices are used to 
estimate daily implicit parameters from the constant volatility jump diffusion (CVJD) model 
used by Bates, a stochastic volatility no-jump (SV) model, and a stochastic volatility jump 
diffusion (SVJD) model, and we analyze the implicit investor expectations of large negative 
price jumps in the stock market. Rather than finding any predictions of the crisis, we find 
evidence of efficient markets as the parameters implied by S&P 500 options move in step with 
the market as a whole. 
 5 
Introduction 
Many economists agree that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was the worst since the 
great depression.1 In hindsight, it seems that the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and heavily-
leveraged trading in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) led to the large fall in the markets (see 
Taylor, 2009). The U.S. stock market crash of 1987 had been similarly subject to backward-
looking explanations, but in 1991 Bates found evidence that the crash was anticipated by 
investors. For his analysis, Bates developed a constant-volatility jump-diffusion (CVJD) option 
pricing model and applied it to historical prices of options on S&P 500 futures, with which he 
estimated the jump parameters implied by out-of-the-money options (Bates, 1991). Bates used 
time series plots of the daily implicit values of these parameters to explore market participants’ 
expectations for the frequency, size, and direction (positive or negative) of discrete jumps in 
stock prices in the months surrounding and including October 1987 (Bates, 1991). He found that 
crash expectations spiked two months before the crash, effectively predicting the event. 
Would we find the same with the financial crisis, considering we now believe that the 
U.S. housing bubble burst in 2006 (see Martin, 2011)? We answer this question with 
methodology that uses an improved option pricing model to apply Bates’ methodology to the 
financial crisis. The key improvement is the inclusion of stochastic volatility. In 1996, Bates 
updated his CVJD model to allow for stochastic volatility as well as jump diffusion parameters 
(the SVJD model). Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997) compared models that incorporated stochastic 
volatility, jump diffusion, or both when pricing S&P 500 options, and found that stochastic 
volatility was the most important factor for the internal consistency of the model and for 
applications involving hedging. Fink and Fink (2006) found that the Bates’ (1996) SVJD model 
                                                          
 
1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/27/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227 
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outperformed the classic Black-Scholes (B-S) model (Black and Scholes 1973), as well as a 
CVJD model by Merton (1976) and a no-jump stochastic volatility (SV) model by Heston 
(1993), in terms of consistency and accuracy when performing Monte Carlo simulations to price 
Google options. Therefore, the SVJD modeling system should offer a significant increase in 
accuracy and retain the implicit jump parameters necessary to analyze investor expectations. To 
allow comparison, we also estimate the parameters of the B-S, CVJD, and SV models in a 
similar way.  
Key Dates and Trends 
In order to thoroughly investigate anticipations of market movements, an overview of 
market trends and large price movements is necessary. The S&P 500 index’s broad range of 
equities make it a good proxy for the U.S. stock market as a whole, and as Bates (1991) explains, 
options on this index are a good indicator of investor expectations. For our analysis, we will 
examine the index from 2006 to 2010. 
General Trends. At the beginning of 2006, the S&P was stable and increasing (see 
Figure 1, Appendix A).2 With few exceptions, this trend continued until July 2007, when major 
price swings became larger and more frequent. Afterwards, the index followed up-and-down 
cycles through its October 2007 peak and continued to cycle until August 2008. The most 
striking period of market decline during the financial crisis occurred between August 2008 and 
March 2009, when we see the most significant discrete index price movements. Although 
scholars disagree on the causes of the financial crisis, this is still the relevant period of reference 
for determining whether investors actually predicted any large negative jumps in the overall 
stock market. We will casually refer to the notable decline in the market over this period as the 
                                                          
 
2 All figures may be found in Appendix A. 
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market “crash.” When the index began to rise from its lowest point (in March 2009), the sizes 
and frequency of price spikes remain heightened relative to 2006 levels, and the market trended 
upward, despite some up-and-down cycles with short periods, including the days surrounding the 
May 2010 Flash Crash. 
Key Dates. We will analyze the behavior of the various models’ parameters on and before 
the trading days with the largest percentage changes in the index price. Therefore, we begin with 
a recap of major financial events, which will allow us to determine whether implicit jump 
expectations were anticipatory or reactionary.3 For convenience, Table 1, Appendix B, lists some 
of the largest S&P price movements during (A) the beginnings of the financial crisis, (B) the 
height of the financial crisis, and (C) the period surrounding the Flash Crash.4  
Perhaps the first large index drop related to the crisis came on February 27, 2007 when 
Freddie Mac publically distanced itself from the riskiest MBS and the S&P fell 3%.5 After this, 
the market resumed a slow and steady incline until June 7, 2007, when Bear Stearns wrote a 
letter to its investors announcing a suspension of redemptions from its primary MBS funds.6 This 
announcement coincided with a modest 2% drop in the index, and when Bear Stearns filed for 
bankruptcy protection for those funds on July 31, 2007, the market had already been dropping 
over the course of the previous week and only fell 1% that day. All of these events occurred 
                                                          
 
3 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis compiled a comprehensive timeline of events related to the financial crisis 
and links to relevant documents. This resource was heavily referenced for this section of the paper, and is available 
here: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline 
4 All tables may be found in Appendix B. 
5 Hagerty, J. R. (2007, Feb 28). Freddie won't buy some subprime loans. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/399035635?accountid=11667 
6 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-12/bear-stearns-subprime-bathbusinessweek-business-news-stock-
market-and-financial-advice 
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during an overall upward trend in the market.7 On March 14, 2008, when Bear Stearns was 
bailed out by the New York Federal Reserve with assistance from  
J.P. Morgan, the index dropped another 2%, but had already been declining steadily for months.8 
The most volatile time during the financial crisis was in mid-September to early 
December 2008, a period that includes the largest percentage increases and decreases in the S&P 
during the observed window (see Table 1, panel B) and perhaps the most likely timeframe for 
crash expectations. On September 15th, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and by September 
17th the Securities and Exchange Commission banned short selling of the stocks of financial 
companies as expectations of other bank failures were high.9,10 The index dropped 5% on each of 
those days, but recovered 4% on each of the subsequent days. On September 29th, when the U.S. 
House of Representatives rejected a bailout bill that had passed in the Senate, the index fell 9% 
with a 5% recovery the following day. In the midst of the worst week ever observed for the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, the S&P itself fell a whopping 8% on October 9th.11,12 On the eve of 
the press conference to unveil the $700 billion bailout fund within the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), the S&P shot up 12% only to fall 9% two days later when the Federal Reserve 
Chairman gave a speech implying that TARP may not do enough to strengthen the U.S. financial 
                                                          
 
7 http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/opinions/brl/158969_24_opinion.pdf 
8 Kelly, K., Ip, G., & Sidel, R. (2008, Mar 15). Fed races to rescue bear stearns in bid to steady financial system; 
storied firm sees stock plunge 47%; J.P. morgan steps in. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/399117778?accountid=11667 
9 http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58572.pdf 
10 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/806085/000110465908059632/a08-22764_4ex99d1.htm 
11 Lueck, S., Paletta, D., & Hitt, G. (2008, Sep 30). Bailout plan rejected, markets plunge, forcing new scramble to 
solve crisis.Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/399111050?accountid=11667 
12 Browning, E. S., Gullapalli, D., & Karmin, C. (2008, Oct 11). Wild day caps worst week ever for stocks; dow 
swings 1019 points in the index's most-volatile session ever; despite 'fire-sale prices,' buyers mostly stand 
back. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/399073781?accountid=11667 
 9 
system. 13,14 On October 28th, when the U.S. Treasury invested $125 billion from its Capital 
Purchase Program (a subset of TARP) to stabilize the nine largest financial institutions, the index 
rose 11%. Then, on November 13th the Treasury announced that it would inject TARP funds 
directly into large banks rather than purchasing illiquid MBS—effectively bolstering financial 
institutions rather than attempting to stave off foreclosures—the S&P spiked 7%.15,16 And when 
Goldman Sachs Group posted a $2 billion loss for the quarter ending in November 2008, 
Goldman’s stock dropped 18% while many other financial institutions’ stocks dropped and the 
S&P 500 index dropped 9%.17 
The Flash Crash of May 2010 provides an opportunity to examine how the models reflect 
investor reactions to large market movements, since this crash could not have been anticipated. 
If we compare how the models' parameters behave in the days surrounding the Flash Crash to the 
parameters' behavior during the financial crisis, we can see whether anticipation or reaction is 
reflected in the data. From March 2009 to April 2010, the S&P 500 index followed a slow and 
relatively steady march upward and over $1,200 mark for the first time since the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy. But, on May 6, 2010, at approximately 2:45 PM eastern time, several blue 
chip stocks crashed within five minutes, likely due to a glitch in a computerized trading 
algorithm.18  Although the stocks mostly rebounded and normalcy resumed, the S&P 500 index 
                                                          
 
13 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122390023840728367?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB122390023840728367.html 
14 Sudeep Reddy, Jennifer Saranow and,Ann Zimmerman. (2008, Oct 16). Economic fears reignite market slump; 
stocks post biggest drop since 1987 crash as retail sales fall, commodities sink and investors worry about hedge 
funds. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/399135539?accountid=11667 
15 http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/291092.pdf, page 78. 
16 http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1265.aspx 
17 Craig, Susanne, Carrick Mollenkamp, and Serena Ng. "Goldman Faces Loss of $2 Billion for Quarter." Wall 
Street Journal, Dec 02, 2008, Eastern edition. http://search.proquest.com/docview/399094887?accountid=11667. 
18 Lauricella, Tom. "Market Plunge Baffles Wall Street --- Trading Glitch Suspected in 'Mayhem' as Dow Falls 
nearly 1,000, then Bounces." Wall Street Journal, May 07, 2010, Eastern edition. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/347976465?accountid=11667. 
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still finished down 3% and down another 2% the following day (See Table 1, panel C). On 
Monday, May 10, the index did rebound 4%, almost returning to its May 5th level. Ten days 
later, the index dropped 4% when the Senate announced a Wall Street reform bill that some 
analysts estimated would cause an annual profit loss of up to 20% for the largest investment 
banks.19 But, on May 21st the index returned to a pattern of slow and steady increase that lasted 
until the end of 2010.  
                                                          
 
19 Smith, Randall. "The Financial Regulation Overhaul: Wall Street Firms Brace for Seismic Changes." Wall Street 
Journal, May 21, 2010, Eastern edition. http://search.proquest.com/docview/304728511?accountid=11667. 
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Option Pricing Models 
To better understand the SVJD model, we will review how the model developed from 
previous models. The first option pricing model of this kind was the famous Black-Scholes 
option pricing formula from their 1973 paper. Merton (1973) co-developed the B-S model, but in 
a 1976 paper, he provided theoretical justification for his CVJD model and developed another 
option pricing formula.20 This is the same formula and theory that Bates applied in his 1991 
paper on the stock market crash of October 1987. Then, Heston (1993) developed an option 
pricing formula for an SV model supported by research which showed that spot volatility is not 
constant over time, as assumed in the B-S model. And in 1996, Bates published an option pricing 
formula for an SVJD model including both discontinuous jumps and stochastic volatility.  
Black-Scholes (B-S) Constant Volatility Model 
The Black-Scholes model is the most famous option pricing model in the literature and is 
the basis for the other three models that we will apply to the data.21 In defining their European 
option pricing model, Black and Scholes assumed the following: 
a.) The risk-free interest rate is known and is constant, and market participants can 
borrow or lend any amount at this rate.  
b.) Stocks or other assets do not pay dividends. 
c.) There are no transaction costs or volume restrictions in buying or selling (or short-
selling) the stock or the option, nor while borrowing or lending at the risk-free rate, 
                                                          
 
20 "The Prize in Economic Sciences 1997 - Press Release". Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2013. Web. 25 Feb 
2014. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1997/press.html> 
21 Heston, Steven L. "A closed-form solution for options with stochastic volatility with applications to bond and 
currency options." Review of financial studies 6.2 (1993): 327-343. 
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and taxes are the same regardless of whether income is from capital gains or 
dividends. This is known as the frictionless market assumption. 
d.) Asset prices follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) process, and therefore 
future asset prices are distributed log-normally.  
Questions of the feasibility of assumption (d) were the driving force leading to the CVJD, 
SV, and SVJD models. As Merton (1976) catalogued, research has shown that the Black-Scholes 
modeling system is still valid even if (a) interest rates are not constant over time, (b) assets pay 
dividends, and (c) markets are not completely frictionless. The GBM assumption asserts that the 
price of the underlying asset changes continuously over time, and that the variance of the 
lognormal distribution is constant over time. Under this assumption, a European call option can 
be calculated as: 22 
 
 
(1) 
where  is the price of the put,  is the price of the underlying asset,  is the strike price or 
exercise price of the option,  is the continuously compounded (annualized) risk-free rate,  is 
the continuously compounded (annualized) dividend yield of the underlying asset,  is the time 
                                                          
 
22 Notation/structure from: Fink, Jason D., and Kristin E. Fink. 2006. "Monte Carlo Simulation for Advanced Option 
Pricing: A Simplifying Tool." Journal of Applied Finance 16, no. 2: 92-105. Business Source Complete, 
EBSCOhost (accessed February 24, 2014). 
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to expiry,  is the constant volatility of returns on the underlying asset, and  is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution.23 
Similarly, the value of a European put option  under the Black-Scholes model is:24 
 
Alternatively, a put may be valued according to put-call parity, an equation that holds 
regardless of the model used to calculate  and  (see McDonald, Cassano, and Fahlenbrach, 
2006): 
 
 Under the Black-Scholes framework, the only unknown value when calculating option 
prices is the constant volatility parameter . By plugging in all the known characteristics of an 
option—  and —and the market price of the option, one can determine the “implied” 
volatility by solving the appropriate above equation for . This implied volatility is the market 
consensus of the true volatility as determined by option prices on the open market, given the 
assumptions of the B-S model. As Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997) point out, implied 
parameters—found by fitting option pricing formulas to market values for the options—are 
necessarily forward-looking, since options are bets or insurance on future price movements. 
Hence, implicit parameters show investors’ expectations for the relevant asset, and since the 
collection of assets in the S&P 500 index is broad, implicit parameters from options on this index 
show expectations for the market as a whole.  
Constant Volatility with Jump Diffusion (CVJD) Model 
                                                          
 
23 Dividend yields were excluded by Black and Scholes (1973) but were included by Merton (1973). 
24 Notation/structure from: Fink, Jason D., and Kristin E. Fink. 2006. "Monte Carlo Simulation for Advanced Option 
Pricing: A Simplifying Tool." Journal of Applied Finance 16, no. 2: 92-105. Business Source Complete, 
EBSCOhost (accessed February 24, 2014). 
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In his 1976 paper, Merton introduced the CVJD model, which allows for asset prices to 
change both continuously and discontinuously, via a stochastic jump process. Merton conceded 
that the Black-Scholes analysis is not invalidated by the fact that price changes cannot be wholly 
continuous and that the Black-Scholes equation holds if the sample path of the asset price 
approaches a continuous sample path as the time between price changes approaches zero. 
However, Merton counters that the Black-Scholes argument is invalid if the sample path of the 
asset does not asymptotically approach a continuous process, which is generally found in the 
paths of asset prices (see Akgiray and Booth, 1986). To correct for this, Merton adds a stochastic 
jump diffusion process to the Black-Scholes model, where discontinuous price jumps arrive via a 
Poisson process and the GBM assumption holds in the absence of a price jump. The resulting 
call option pricing formula is: 
 
 
 
 
where  is the constant volatility of the continuous portion of the process,  is the mean number 
of discontinuous jumps in asset prices per year (governed by a Poisson process),  is the mean 
jump size (as a percentage of the asset price) given that a jump occurs,  is the standard 
deviation of jump sizes, and S, X, r, δ, , and N( ) are defined as above in the Black-Scholes case. 
Again, the price of a put option may be calculated by put-call parity as in equation (2). 
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Here,  is volatility conditional on no jumps occurring. The variance (volatility squared) 
given that a jump occurs can be calculated as: 
 
 The unconditional spot variance is the sum of the variance conditional on no jumps 
occurring and the variance given that a jump occurs. The square root of this unconditional 
variance is the spot volatility, given by: 
 
This model has four unknowns, the continuous volatility σ, the unconditional mean jump 
size (as a percentage of the spot price) , the annual frequency of jumps , and standard 
deviation of jump size . Bates (1991) used this model’s implied parameters from S&P 500 
European option data from 1985-1987 to find investors’ jump risk expectations prior to and 
immediately after the October 19-20 stock market crash in 1987. A key insight by him was to 
plot the product  daily to show a proxy for the expected annual change in price due to 
discontinuous jumps. This time series plot showed that two months before the crash occurred, 
expectations of severe negative price jumps were implicit in options prices. While the  plot is 
instructive, it does not have a mathematically intuitive meaning. This paper will instead plot the 
implicit mean annual change in asset prices due to discontinuous jumps, calculated as: 
 
Notice that both the CVJD and B-S model assume that the continuous volatility 
parameter  is constant. Under this assumption, the implied  for options on a single asset 
should be constant across different strike prices. However, this is not observed in the data, and 
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instead volatility “smiles”, “smirks”, or “frowns” are often observed (see Fink and Fink, 2006), 
indicating that volatility may also change over time. 
Stochastic Volatility (SV) Model 
Heston (1993) introduced an option pricing model where asset prices are assumed to 
follow a continuous sample path as in the B-S framework, but volatility is modeled using a 
stochastic mean-reversion process and the innovations of asset price and volatility are correlated. 
Using the parameter notation used by Fink and Fink (2006) and the equation structure used by 
Epps (2000), the SV model prices options as follows: 25 
 
where  and  are defined by  as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
25 Call option prices may be calculated using put-call parity. 
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where 
 
 
 
Here,  is the instantaneous variance of asset price (volatility squared);  are 
parameters governing the mean reversion process of the instantaneous variance;  is the 
volatility of volatility;  and  are Weiner processes associated with price and volatility, 
respectively; and the inputs  and  are defined as above. Since, the SV model has no 
jump component, the parameter  is unconditional. Therefore, the spot variance is simply , 
and the long-run volatility is . 
 
Stochastic Volatility with Jump Diffusion (SVJD) Model 
In his 1996 paper, Bates referenced previous research showing that asset price variance is 
not constant—a theoretical validation for the SV model—and that asset price sample paths 
sometimes involve discontinuous jumps—a theoretical validation for the jump-diffusion 
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model—and combined the two into the SVJD model. Like the CVJD model, the SVJD model 
has the necessary parameters to show whether investors expected a market crash at any time 
surrounding or during the financial crisis via time series plots of equation (4); but the SVJD 
model also allows for implied stochastic volatility and implied correlation between the 
innovations in asset price and volatility. Again using the Fink and Fink (2006) parameter 
definitions and the Epps (2000) formula structure, the SVJD option pricing formula is: 26 
 
where  and  are defined by  as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
26 Call option prices may be calculated using put-call parity. 
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where  
 
 
 
 
 
The inputs  and  have their usual definitions; the jump-diffusion parameters—  
and —are defined as in the CVJD process; and the stochastic volatility parameters—  
and —are defined as in the SV process. In this model,  is the instantaneous spot variance 
conditional on no jumps, similar to  in the CVJD model. Therefore, the volatility due to the 
discontinuous jump process and the unconditional spot volatility are similar to the CVJD case: 
 
 
 20 
 
Jump expectations for the SVJD model may be calculated using equation (4), just as with the 
CVJD model. 
 21 
Estimation 
Data 
Option Data. Option data on the S&P 500 index from January 2006 through December 
2010 was obtained from the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s historical data retailer, Market 
Data Express.27 This data lists daily information on all European options available for trading. 
For each option the following information was listed: the trade date, that day’s S&P closing 
price, the exercise date of the option, the strike price, whether the option was a call or a put, the 
open interest in the option as of that date, the trade volume of the option on that date, and the last 
bid and last ask prices on the option for that date.  
Certain constraints were placed on the data so that parameter optimization was only 
applied to the most suitable data. Only options with more than five days and fewer than six 
months to expiry were considered, since options expiring within five days convey little about 
future market sentiment and options expiring more than 6 months out fail to convey investor’s 
short term expectations. Any option that was available but was not traded at all on a certain day 
(volume equal to zero) was removed from that day’s data, because such options would not be 
relevant to that day’s implied parameters. All options with an open interest level less than 50 on 
a given day were excluded as a way of removing thinly traded options. Of all options in the data 
package, the median open interest was 8,298 and the cutoff open interest level of 50 was 
approximately the 10th percentile.  
For optimization, the market price of each option was calculated as the midpoint between 
the last bid and last ask prices—the raw bid-ask spread. Options with a percentage spread greater 
                                                          
 
27 The product is called Optsum and was purchased from www.marketdataexpress.com via a link on 
www.cboe.com.  
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than 50% were excluded in order to avoid misrepresentation of market trading value for such 
options. 28 The final data set consists of 262,962 options across 1,259 trading days (208.8658 per 
day), with 108,658 calls (86.3050 per day) and 154,304 puts (122.5608 per day).  
Interest Rate and Dividend Yield Data. Risk-free rates were estimated using 3-month 
U.S. Treasury Bill yields as listed in the Fama-French Liquidity Factors dataset housed in the 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) database.29 One risk-free rate was used for all options 
within a given trading month, since Bates (1996) and Scott (1993) found this simplification has 
little impact on analysis of relatively short-dated options. The Fama-French website lists the 
daily effective rate (based on 251 trading days per year), . This rate was converted to a 
continuously compounded rate, . 
Dividend yields were calculated using data available on Dr. Robert Shiller’s website.30 
Since earnings and dividends of the S&P 500 data were provided monthly, within each trading 
month the same dividend yield was assumed. A nominal monthly dividend yield was calculated 
as  . Then, a continuously compounded dividend yield was calculated 
as  . 
Parameter Optimization 
Once the data was constrained as above and the appropriate risk-free rates and dividend 
yield rates were included in each month’s data, separate data files were created for each trading 
                                                          
 
28  
29 www.wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/famafrench/factors_d.cfm  
30 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm  
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day’s options. As Bates (1991) stated, estimating new parameters for every trading day may be 
appear to violate the option pricing models’ assumption that the parameters either are constant or 
change slowly over time, but this daily estimation method provides vital insight about how 
market sentiments are changing over time. We must keep this potential inconsistency in mind 
when we interpret the estimated daily parameters.  
For all four models discussed above, implicit daily parameters were estimated via non-
linear least squares using a trust region reflexive algorithm.31 Every option within a day’s data 
listed the index price , whether the option was a call or a put, the risk-free rate , the dividend 
yield , the strike price , and the time to expiry . This input data was fit to the options’ market 
prices by non-linear least squares optimization of the parameters of the particular option pricing 
model (B-S, CVJD, SV, or SVJD).32 For each parameter, lower and upper bounds were 
stipulated to speed computation and to maintain consistency with the meanings of each 
parameter (see Table 2). Additionally, an initial guess at each parameter’s value is supplied. To 
reconcile the potential inconsistencies of re-estimating parameters daily, each day’s initial-guess 
vector was set equal to the previous day’s estimated parameters.  
For each model, the least squares algorithm was applied to each trading day's data 
individually, simultaneously optimizing the parameters across all option data for that day. The 
estimation process resulted in daily vectors of parameters that minimize the entire trading day’s 
                                                          
 
31 The least squares fit was completed using the LSQCURVEFIT function in MATLAB. See Appendix C for the 
code. 
32 For the CVJD model, the infinite sum of equation (3) was truncated at n=k if the absolute difference in option 
price changed by less than 0.000001 when the summand for n=k+1 was added. Similarly, the bounds of the 
integrands for the SV and SVJD model, equations (5) and (6), were estimated by increasing c by increments of 1 
until the absolute difference in F or G going from c=k to c=k+1 was less than 0.000001, with independent truncation 
points for F and G. Each integral calculation was numerically computed using Gaussian quadrature via Matlab’s 
“integral” function (see Appendix C for the code). 
 24 
sum of squared errors between expected option prices (according to the particular model) and the 
observed trading prices of the options. 
 25 
Results 
Table 3 displays the pricing error measurements for each model’s estimated parameters. 
As expected based on previous research, the CVJD, SV, and SVJD models all provided average 
absolute pricing error reductions relative to B-S. 33 As expected, the SVJD model outperformed 
all other models in every measure of performance, and the SV and CVJD models consistently 
outperformed the B-S model.  
Black-Scholes Implied Parameters 
Figure 2 shows a time series plot of implied volatility  from the Black-Scholes model. 
In 2006, implied volatility is fairly steady and low relative to the historical average of 19.5%.34 
In mid-2007, investors began to expect more volatility in the market and a sustained period of 
heightened implied volatility begins just before Lehman Brothers’ collapse and  does not return 
to the 20% mark until the end of 2009. Since  is the only unknown parameter in the Black-
Scholes framework, upon which each of the other models is built, this parameter provides a 
benchmark for evaluating the market reactions of parameters in the other models. Figures 1 and 2 
display the typical inverse relationship between asset price and volatility, which is a key 
component of the SV and SVJD models. 
CVJD Implicit Parameters 
Figure 3A-3F contains the time series plots of the estimated CVJD parameters: (A) the 
implicit annual continuous volatility (conditional on no price jumps occurring) , (B) the 
implicit standard deviation of jump sizes , (C) the implicit annual jump volatility 
                                                          
 
33 This format for expressing measurements of error is borrowed from Fink and Fink (2006). 
34 Based on the daily adjusted close of the VIX from 1990 to 2005. Source: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EVIX&a=00&b=2&c=1990&d=00&e=2&f=2006&g=d 
 26 
, (D) the implicit spot volatility  
and the deviation of it from Black-Scholes implied volatility—the dashed line, (E) the mean 
number of discontinuous price jumps per year , and (F) the mean jump size as a percentage of 
the asset price . 35 Although the continuous volatility  is considered constant, the spot 
volatility depends both on  and on jump volatility, which in turn depends on , , and . 
Therefore, heightened jump expectations would cause heightened spot volatility. Despite this, the 
spot volatility for CVJD rarely differs significantly from B-S implied volatility (see Figure 3, 
panel D). Figure 3, panel C shows that  largely follows the pattern of B-S implied volatility 
(Figure 2) before and after the worst of the financial crisis in September and October 2008, 
except that the CVJD  has near-zero values during this worst period. The overall implicit spot 
volatility for CVJD still continues to mirror B-S implied volatility because of the inclusion of 
jump variance.  
Figure 4 shows the time series plot of CVJD implicit jump expectations, calculated using 
equation (4).36 In general, these expectations seem to move in-step with price movements of the 
index but with inverse direction. The only sustained period of negative jump expectations of a 
size found by Bates’ (1991) analysis is during the September–October 2008 period, with nothing 
more than spikes during less tumultuous periods. This indicates that options buyers’ expectations 
continued to move along with the index even during the financial crisis. We analyze implicit 
jump expectations in more detail below. 
SV Implied Parameters 
                                                          
 
35 This format of plotting the implicit parameters is borrowed from Bates (1991). 
36 The correlation between the implicit values of this version of jump expectations and the version that Bates (1991) 
used is 0.882994 for the CVJD model. 
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 Figure 5A-5D contains the time series plots of the estimated SV parameters: (A) the 
implicit spot volatility , (B) the implicit long-run volatility , (C) the implicit 
volatility of volatility , and (D) the implicit correlation between innovations in asset prices and 
volatility . The time series plot of  largely follows Black-Scholes implied volatility ( ), 
with deviations occurring because  has spikes much larger than Black-Scholes during the 
most volatile time periods, especially in the fall of 2008 and during May 2010. Because  
follows  so closely, it appears to have the same inverse relationship to asset prices as , and 
we see this reflected in the parameter . The plot of  in Figure 5D is noisy and therefore 
patterns are difficult to detect, but the centered-moving average plot in Figure 6 is illustrative. 
We see that this implicit correlation does not move directly nor inversely with the index, but the 
correlation is always negative and  becomes and remains very close to negative one throughout 
the financial crisis. 
SVJD Implicit Parameters 
Figure 7A-7I contains the time series plots for the estimated SVJD parameters: (A) the 
implicit continuous volatility ; (B) the implicit long-run continuous volatility ; (C) the 
implicit volatility of volatility ; (D) the implicit standard deviation of jump size ; (E) the 
implicit jump volatility ; (F) the implicit unconditional spot 
volatility  and the deviation from Black-Scholes implied 
volatility in the dashed line; (G) the implicit correlation of innovations in asset prices and 
continuous volatility ; (H) the implicit annual mean number of discrete jumps ; and (I) the 
implicit mean jump size as a percentage of the asset price . The plot of  (Figure 7A) 
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matches fairly well with the plot of  (Figure 2), and therefore displays an inverse relationship 
between the index price and the continuous volatility. As with the SV model, this information is 
reflected in the parameter . The main difference between the plots of  and  is that the 
upward and downward spikes are much larger for . This is probably due to the fluctuation 
allowed by the volatility of volatility , which also has a plot that follows the pattern of , 
indicating that when the continuous volatility increases in the SVJD model, the range of likely 
movements for that volatility also increases, leading to the larger spikes that are shown in Figure 
7A. The time series plot of jump volatility (Figure 7E) does not seem to have a direct or inverse 
relationship with , and the implicit jump volatility even goes nearly to zero during the height 
of the financial crisis. While the spot volatility graph (Figure 7F) follows  fairly well leading 
up to and coming out of the financial crisis, it deviates heavily during the majority of the crisis 
and repeats this deviation after the Flash Crash. By investigating Figure 7D, we can attribute 
these deviations to the increased   values throughout the crisis. The plot of the correlation 
parameter  (Figure 7G) is noisy, as in the SV case, but the centered moving average (Figure 8) 
gives a clearer picture. Unlike the  parameter in the SV model, the correlation parameter here is 
sometimes strongly positive, but is consistently near negative one before, during, and after the 
financial crisis. 
Figure 9 plots the SVJD implicit jump expectations , which differ greatly 
from the CVJD case (Figure 4).37 As expected from the time series plot of implicit mean jump 
size (Figure 7H), the jump expectations plot is not always negative, and even the negative values 
                                                          
 
37 The correlation between the implicit values of this version of jump expectations and the version that Bates (1991) 
used is 0.929855 for the SVJD model. 
 29 
are muted compared to the CVJD model. We also see a lag in the response to the financial crisis, 
since annual price jumps do not reach values below negative 20% until mid-to-late October 
2008. Then, jump expectations return to positive values as early as mid-December 2008. We 
examine the jump expectations for both the CVJD and SVJD models in more detail below. 
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Discussion 
The most direct way to determine whether investors anticipated a stock market crash 
using the implicit parameters above is to examine the jump expectations of the CVJD and SVJD 
models. While there is no universally accepted numerical definition of a stock market crash, it 
suffices for us to look for time periods between 2006 and 2010 in which heightened risk of 
significant negative, discontinuous index price movements are implicit in S&P 500 options. We 
will break the five-year period into three smaller segments for closer examination. Segment A 
(January 2006 to August 2008) covers a long period of steady increases in the index until its 
peak in October 2006, followed by a slow downturn including the major events in panel A of 
Table 1. Segment B (August 2008 to December 2008) includes the most drastic index downturns 
and rebounds that occurred during the financial crisis, including the events in panel B of Table 1. 
Segment C (April 2010 to June 2010) shows market reactions to the Flash Crash and other events 
in panel C of Table 1, followed by a return to the index’s slow and steady recovery. Figure 10A-
10B shows the segmentations of the time series plots for the S&P 500 index and the implicit 
jump expectations from the SVJD and CVJD models. The vertical lines represent the midpoints 
of August 2008, December 2008, April 2010 and June 2010. Looking at the five years of data as 
a whole, we see no evidence that implied jump expectations anticipated the movements of the 
index—there do not appear to be any sustained periods of large negative jump expectations 
weeks or months before actual downturns in the index. However, in Figure 10B, the CVJD jump 
expectations (dashed line) take on large negative values in August 2007 and between February 
and March 2008. While these values seem disproportionate to the actual size of drops in the 
index, the spikes are not sustained. This may be better evidence for an overreaction in the change 
of options prices than for crash predictions. Interestingly, the spikes for the SVJD model (Figure 
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10B, solid line) sometimes seem to be lagging those in the plots for the CVJD model and the 
S&P 500 index in terms of negative jump expectations coinciding with declines in the index. 
This may be because the market pessimism implicit in options prices manifests as jump risk in 
the CVJD model, but manifests partially as heightened volatility and negative correlation 
between the volatility and the asset price in the SVJD model. 
Segment A, January 2006 to August 2008. Figure 11A-11B below gives the times series 
plots for the index and implicit jump expectations from the SVJD and CVJD models for the 
period from January 3, 2006 to August 15, 2008, plotted on the same scales as Figure 10. 
Generally, the CVJD jump expectations plot (Figure 11B, dashed line) moves 
contemporaneously with the index and most of its moves are proportionate, indicating that there 
were no crash predictions or over-reactionary jump expectations during this period. The SVJD 
model’s jump expectations plot movements (Figure 11B, solid line) are not as well-synchronized 
with index price changes, and the sizes of the jumps are muted compared to both the movements 
in the index and the corresponding CVJD plot. We see no indications of crash predictions in the 
implicit SVJD parameters during this time period, but the jump parameters of both models do 
seem to respond to significant changes in the S&P price. On each of the highlighted dates, when 
the index drops by 2% or more, the CVJD model’s jump expectations also drop significantly, 
and the same is true for the SVJD model with the exception of March 14, 2008.  
Segment B, August 2008 to December 2008. Figure 12A-12B below gives the times 
series plots for the index and implicit jump expectations from the SVJD and CVJD models for 
the period from August 15, 2008 to December 15, 2008. The CVJD model’s implicit jump 
expectations seem to predict a worst-case scenario (a crash), except that these negative jump 
expectations arise and recede as the index falls and rebounds—that is, the movements in Figure 
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12B appear to be responsive rather than predictive. The jump expectations go largely negative 
three days before Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and stayed largely negative for the rest 
of 2008, but the index itself was also declining for several days prior to the bankruptcy, and this 
shift in the CVJD plot may indicate more of an “awakening” of the market than a crash 
prediction.  
The SVJD model’s implicit jump expectations (Figure 12B, solid line) remain largely 
unmoved during much of September and October before large negative swings at the end of 
October and end of November. These SVJD jump expectations do not seem to anticipate a crash, 
nor do they appear to react swiftly to downturns in the index, at least as compared to CVJD plot. 
Again, the magnitude of jump expectations implicit in the SVJD model are muted compared to 
the CVJD model, and this may be because downside risk is being modeled as enlarged volatility 
and continuous index declines rather than expected discontinuous price jumps.  
 Segment C, April 2010 to June 2010. The Flash Crash occurred on May 6, 2010 and 
while the individual stocks affected by the 2:45 computer glitch did recover, the index still 
dropped 3% on the day and fell another 2% the following day. 38 The index almost completely 
recovered on May 10, and saw sharp declines later in May that were likely unrelated to the Flash 
Crash. Figure 13A-13B below gives the time series plots for the index and implicit jump 
expectations from the SVJD and CVJD models for the period from April 15, 2010 to June 15, 
2010. The Flash Crash provides another opportunity to show crash expectations or persistent 
increased risk of negative price jumps that may be implicit in the options market, but both the 
CVJD and SVJD models’ jump expectations seem to move with the market rather than ahead of 
                                                          
 
38 Lauricella, Tom. "Market Plunge Baffles Wall Street --- Trading Glitch Suspected in 'Mayhem' as Dow Falls 
nearly 1,000, then Bounces." Wall Street Journal, May 07, 2010, Eastern edition. 
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it, and in relatively muted fashion compared to the parameter levels we see during the financial 
crisis. We see that jump expectations behave similarly in the days surrounding the unpredictable 
Flash Crash and during the financial crisis, which indicates that investors were reacting to the 
market movements of the financial crisis rather than anticipating them. 
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Conclusion 
Of the four models applied to the data set of daily prices of options on the S&P 500 
index, the SVJD model fit the best, in agreement with the findings by previous researchers this 
model typically has the best options pricing performance and the most internal consistency of 
these four models. Plots of implicit jump expectations from the CVJD and SVJD models 
indicated that investor sentiment as expressed by options prices was merely reactive to the events 
of the financial crisis (and Flash Crash), and was not an indicator of stock market crash 
predictions like Bates (1991) found before the 1987 crash. We see that market participants were 
optimistic and expecting continued prosperity throughout 2006, and that concern about the 
financial system began to rise in mid-2007, but that information implicit in options prices did not 
predict the kind of decline that marked the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
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Appendix A: Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. S&P 500 index prices, 2006-2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Black-Scholes implicit volatility: . 
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Figure 3. CVJD parameters implied by European options on the S&P 500 index, 2006-2010. The plots 
in each panel are of: A) the implicit continuous volatility conditional on no price jumps occurring ; B) the 
implicit standard deviation of jump sizes ; C) the implicit jump volatility: ; D) the 
implicit spot volatility:  and the deviation of it from Black-Scholes implied 
volatility (dashed line); E) mean number of discontinuous price jumps per year ; and F) the mean jump size as a 
percentage of the asset price . 
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Figure 3.—Continued  
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Figure 3.—Continued  
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Figure 4. CVJD jump expectations implied by European options on the S&P 500 index, 2006-2010: 
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Figure 5. SV parameters implied by European options on the S&P 500 index, 2006-2010. The plots in 
each panel are of: A) the implicit spot volatility ; B) the implicit long-run volatility ; C) the implicit 
volatility of volatility ; and D) the implicit correlation between the innovations in asset prices and volatility . 
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Figure 5.—Continued  
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Figure 6. Time series plot of 11-day centered moving average of SV implicit correlation parameter . 
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Figure 7. SVJD parameters implied by European options on the S&P 500 index, 2006-2010. The plots in 
each panel are of: A) the implicit continuous volatility ; B) the implicit long-run continuous volatility ; 
C) the implicit volatility of volatility ; D) the implicit standard deviation of jump size ; E) the implicit jump 
volatility ; F) the implicit unconditional spot volatility  and 
the deviation from Black-Scholes (dashed line); G) the implicit correlation of the innovations in asset prices and 
continuous volatility ; H) the implicit annual mean number of discrete jumps ; and I) the implicit mean jump 
size as a percentage of the asset price . 
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Figure 7.—Continued  
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Figure 7.—Continued   
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Figure 7.—Continued  
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Figure 7.—Continued  
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Figure 8. Time series plot of 11-day centered moving average of SVJD implicit correlation parameter . 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. SVJD jump expectations implied by European options on the S&P 500 index, 2006-2010: . 
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Figure 10. Segmenting the data for detailed analysis. The vertical dashed lines represent the midpoints of 
August 2008, December 2008, April 2008, and June 2008. The three segmentation graphs are for: A) the S&P 
500 index; and B) implicit jump expectations from the SVJD model (solid line) and the CVJD model (dashed 
line). 
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Figure 11. Segment A: January 3, 2006 to August 15, 2008. The vertical dashed lines represent February 
27th; June 7th; and July 31st, 2007; and March 14th, 2008, respectively. The time series plots are for: A) the S&P 
500 index; and B) implicit jump expectations from the SVJD model (solid line) and the CVJD model (dashed 
line). 
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Figure 12. Segment B: August 15, 2008 to December 15, 2008. The vertical dashed lines represent 
September 15th, 17th, and 29th; October 9th, 13th, 15th, 28th; November 13th; and December 1st, 2008, respectively. 
The time series plots are for: A) the S&P 500 index; and B) implicit jump expectations from the SVJD model 
(solid line) and the CVJD model (dashed line). 
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Figure 13. Segment C: April 15, 2010 to June 10, 2010. The vertical dashed lines represent May 6th, 7th, 10th, 
14th, and 20th, 2010, respectively. The time series plots are for: A) the S&P 500 index; and B) implicit jump 
expectations from the SVJD model (solid line) and the CVJD model (dashed line). 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
A Date S&P 500 Index Change (%) Change ($) 
 2/27/2007 $1,399.04 -3% -$50.33 
 6/7/2007 $1,490.72 -2% -$26.66 
 7/31/2007 $1,455.27 -1% -$18.64 
 3/14/2008 $1,288.14 -2% -$27.34 
     
B Date S&P 500 Index Change (%) Change ($) 
 9/15/2008 $1,192.70 -5% -$59.00 
 9/17/2008 $1,156.39 -5% -$57.21 
 9/29/2008 $1,106.42 -9% -$106.85 
 10/9/2008 $909.92 -8% -$75.02 
 10/13/2008 $1,003.35 12% $104.13 
 10/15/2008 $907.84 -9% -$90.17 
 10/28/2008 $940.51 11% $91.59 
 11/13/2008 $911.29 7% $58.99 
 12/1/2008 $816.21 -9% -$80.03 
     
C Date S&P 500 Index Change (%) Change ($) 
 5/6/2010 $1,128.15 -3% -$37.72 
 5/7/2010 $1,110.88 -2% -$17.27 
 5/10/2010 $1,159.73 4% $48.85 
 5/14/2010 $1,135.68 -2% -$21.76 
 5/20/2010 $1,071.59 -4% -$43.46 
 
Table 1. List of important dates for S&P 500 index. Includes dates, index closing prices, and price changes in 
percentages and dollars for dates: (A) leading up to and beginning the financial crisis, (B) during the height of the 
financial crisis, and (C) surrounding the Flash Crash of May 2010. 
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Parameter Description 
Applicable 
Models 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
 continuous volatility B-S, CVJD 0.00001 1.5 
  instantaneous continuous variance SV, SVJD 0.00001 1.5 
 
 mean number of jumps per year CVJD, SVJD 0 160 
 
 
mean jump size (percentage), given a jump 
occurs 
CVJD, SVJD -0.95 0.95 
 
 jump volatility CVJD, SVJD 0.00001 0.99 
  long-run variance parameters SV, SVJD 0.00001 20 
 
 volatility of volatility SV, SVJD 0.00001 2 
 
 
correlation of asset price and continuous 
volatility 
SV, SVJD -0.99999 0.99999 
         
   Table 2. List of lower and upper bounds for parameter estimation algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Error Measure B-S CVJD SV SVJD 
 Average Absolute Price Error $ 3.20 $ 1.67 $ 2.24 $ 1.55 
 Maximum Absolute Price Error $ 9.40 $ 3.91 $ 6.43 $ 3.53 
 Average Absolute Percentage Error 38.27 % 29.39 % 29.70 % 13.45 % 
 Maximum Absolute Percentage Error 144.99 % 138.78 % 181.62 % 66.64 % 
 Sum of Squared Price Errors 3,492,907 962,825 1,672,028 684,975 
      
Table 3. Pricing errors for all four models. Based on calculated prices for each of the 262,962 options using the 
appropriate trading day’s estimated parameters. 
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Appendix C: Matlab Code 
The following is the code for Matlab’s “lsqcurvefit.m” program, which was used for least-
squares estimation of daily parameters, as described on page 23 above. Comment lines begin 
with “%”. 
 
 
function [xCurrent,Resnorm,FVAL,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT,LAMBDA,JACOB] = 
lsqcurvefit(FUN,xCurrent,XDATA,YDATA,LB,UB,options,varargin) 
 
%LSQCURVEFIT solves non-linear least squares problems. 
%   LSQCURVEFIT attempts to solve problems of the form: 
%   min  sum {(FUN(X,XDATA)-YDATA).^2}  where X, XDATA, YDATA and the 
%    X values returned by FUN can be vectors or matrices. 
% 
%   LSQCURVEFIT implements two different algorithms: trust region reflective and  
%   Levenberg-Marquardt. Choose one via the option Algorithm: for instance, to  
%   choose Levenberg-Marquardt, set OPTIONS = optimset('Algorithm','levenberg-marquardt'),  
%   and then pass OPTIONS to LSQCURVEFIT.   
% 
%   X = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA,YDATA) starts at X0 and finds coefficients 
%   X to best fit the nonlinear functions in FUN to the data YDATA (in the  
%   least-squares sense). FUN accepts inputs X and XDATA and returns a 
%   vector (or matrix) of function values F, where F is the same size as 
%   YDATA, evaluated at X and XDATA. NOTE: FUN should return FUN(X,XDATA) 
%   and not the sum-of-squares sum((FUN(X,XDATA)-YDATA).^2). 
%   ((FUN(X,XDATA)-YDATA) is squared and summed implicitly in the 
%   algorithm.)  
% 
%   X = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA,YDATA,LB,UB) defines a set of lower and 
%   upper bounds on the design variables, X, so that the solution is in the 
%   range LB <= X <= UB. Use empty matrices for LB and UB if no bounds 
%   exist. Set LB(i) = -Inf if X(i) is unbounded below; set UB(i) = Inf if 
%   X(i) is unbounded above. 
% 
%   X = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA,YDATA,LB,UB,OPTIONS) minimizes with the 
%   default parameters replaced by values in the structure OPTIONS, an 
%   argument created with the OPTIMSET function. See OPTIMSET for details. 
%   Use the Jacobian option to specify that FUN also returns a second output  
%   argument J that is the Jacobian matrix at the point X. If FUN returns  
%   a vector F of m components when X has length n, then J is an m-by-n matrix  
%   where J(i,j) is the partial derivative of F(i) with respect to x(j).  
%   (Note that the Jacobian J is the transpose of the gradient of F.) 
% 
%   X = LSQCURVEFIT(PROBLEM) solves the non-linear least squares problem  
%   defined in PROBLEM. PROBLEM is a structure with the function FUN in  
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%   PROBLEM.objective, the start point in PROBLEM.x0, the 'xdata' in  
%   PROBLEM.xdata, the 'ydata' in PROBLEM.ydata, the lower bounds in  
%   PROBLEM.lb, the upper bounds in PROBLEM.ub, the options structure in  
%   PROBLEM.options, and solver name 'lsqcurvefit' in PROBLEM.solver. Use  
%   this syntax to solve at the command line a problem exported from  
%   OPTIMTOOL. The structure PROBLEM must have all the fields. 
% 
%   [X,RESNORM] = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA,YDATA,...) returns the value of  
%   the squared 2-norm of the residual at X: sum {(FUN(X,XDATA)-YDATA).^2}. 
% 
%   [X,RESNORM,RESIDUAL] = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,...) returns the value of  
%   residual, FUN(X,XDATA)-YDATA, at the solution X.  
% 
%   [X,RESNORM,RESIDUAL,EXITFLAG] = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA,YDATA,...)  
%   returns an EXITFLAG that describes the exit condition of LSQCURVEFIT.  
%   Possible values of EXITFLAG and the corresponding exit conditions are 
%   listed below. See the documentation for a complete description. 
% 
%     1  LSQCURVEFIT converged to a solution. 
%     2  Change in X too small. 
%     3  Change in RESNORM too small. 
%     4  Computed search direction too small. 
%     0  Too many function evaluations or iterations. 
%    -1  Stopped by output/plot function. 
%    -2  Bounds are inconsistent. 
% 
%   [X,RESNORM,RESIDUAL,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT] = LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA, 
%   YDATA,...) returns a structure OUTPUT with the number of iterations  
%   taken in OUTPUT.iterations, the number of function evaluations in  
%   OUTPUT.funcCount, the algorithm used in OUTPUT.algorithm, the number of 
%   CG iterations (if used) in OUTPUT.cgiterations, the first-order  
%   optimality (if used) in OUTPUT.firstorderopt, and the exit message in  
%   OUTPUT.message. 
% 
%   [X,RESNORM,RESIDUAL,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT,LAMBDA] = 
LSQCURVEFIT(FUN,X0,XDATA, 
%   YDATA,...) returns the set of Lagrangian multipliers, LAMBDA, at the  
%   solution: LAMBDA.lower for LB and LAMBDA.upper for UB. 
% 
%   [X,RESNORM,RESIDUAL,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT,LAMBDA,JACOBIAN] = 
LSQCURVEFIT(FUN, 
%   X0,XDATA,YDATA,...) returns the Jacobian of FUN at X. 
% 
%   Examples 
%     FUN can be specified using @: 
%        xdata = [5;4;6];          % example xdata 
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%        ydata = 3*sin([5;4;6])+6; % example ydata 
%        x = lsqcurvefit(@myfun, [2 7], xdata, ydata) 
% 
%   where myfun is a MATLAB function such as: 
% 
%       function F = myfun(x,xdata) 
%       F = x(1)*sin(xdata)+x(2); 
% 
%   FUN can also be an anonymous function: 
%       x = lsqcurvefit(@(x,xdata) x(1)*sin(xdata)+x(2),[2 7],xdata,ydata) 
% 
%   If FUN is parameterized, you can use anonymous functions to capture the  
%   problem-dependent parameters. Suppose you want to solve the  
%   curve-fitting problem given in the function myfun, which is  
%   parameterized by its second argument c. Here myfun is a MATLAB file  
%   function such as 
% 
%       function F = myfun(x,xdata,c) 
%       F = x(1)*exp(c*xdata)+x(2); 
% 
%   To solve the curve-fitting problem for a specific value of c, first  
%   assign the value to c. Then create a two-argument anonymous function  
%   that captures that value of c and calls myfun with three arguments.  
%   Finally, pass this anonymous function to LSQCURVEFIT: 
% 
%       xdata = [3; 1; 4];           % example xdata 
%       ydata = 6*exp(-1.5*xdata)+3; % example ydata      
%       c = -1.5;                    % define parameter  
%       x = lsqcurvefit(@(x,xdata) myfun(x,xdata,c),[5;1],xdata,ydata) 
% 
%   See also OPTIMSET, LSQNONLIN, FSOLVE, @, INLINE. 
 
%   Copyright 1990-2011 The MathWorks, Inc. 
%   $Revision: 1.1.6.10 $  $Date: 2011/07/31 13:15:53 $ 
 
% ------------Initialization---------------- 
defaultopt = struct(... 
    'Algorithm','trust-region-reflective',... 
    'DerivativeCheck','off',... 
    'Diagnostics','off',... 
    'DiffMaxChange',Inf,... 
    'DiffMinChange',0,... 
    'Display','final',... 
    'FinDiffRelStep', [], ... 
    'FinDiffType','forward',...     
    'FunValCheck','off',... 
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    'Jacobian','off',... 
    'JacobMult',[],...  
    'JacobPattern','sparse(ones(Jrows,Jcols))',... 
    'MaxFunEvals',[],... 
    'MaxIter',400,... 
    'MaxPCGIter','max(1,floor(numberOfVariables/2))',... 
    'OutputFcn',[],... 
    'PlotFcns',[],... 
    'PrecondBandWidth',Inf,... 
    'ScaleProblem','none',... 
    'TolFun',1e-6,... 
    'TolPCG',0.1,... 
    'TolX',1e-6,... 
    'TypicalX','ones(numberOfVariables,1)'); 
 
% If just 'defaults' passed in, return the default options in X 
if nargin==1 && nargout <= 1 && isequal(FUN,'defaults') 
   xCurrent = defaultopt; 
   return 
end 
 
if nargin < 7 
    options = []; 
    if nargin < 6 
        UB = []; 
        if nargin < 5 
            LB = []; 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
problemInput = false; 
if nargin == 1 
    if isa(FUN,'struct') 
        problemInput = true; 
        [FUN,xCurrent,XDATA,YDATA,LB,UB,options] = separateOptimStruct(FUN); 
    else % Single input and non-structure. 
        error(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InputArg')); 
    end 
end 
 
if nargin < 4 && ~problemInput 
    error(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:NotEnoughInputs')); 
end 
 
% Check for non-double inputs 
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% SUPERIORFLOAT errors when superior input is neither single nor double; 
% We use try-catch to override SUPERIORFLOAT's error message when input 
% data type is integer. 
try 
    dataType = superiorfloat(xCurrent,YDATA,LB,UB); 
catch ME 
    if strcmp(ME.identifier,'MATLAB:datatypes:superiorfloat') 
        dataType = 'notDouble'; 
    end 
end 
if ~strcmp(dataType,'double') 
    error(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:NonDoubleInput')) 
end 
 
caller = 'lsqcurvefit'; 
[funfcn_x_xdata,mtxmpy_xdata,flags,sizes,funValCheck,xstart,lb,ub,EXITFLAG, ... 
    Resnorm,FVAL,LAMBDA,JACOB,OUTPUT,earlyTermination] = ... 
    lsqnsetup(FUN,xCurrent,LB,UB,options,defaultopt,caller,nargout,length(varargin)); 
if earlyTermination 
    return % premature return because of problem detected in lsqnsetup() 
end 
 
xCurrent(:) = xstart; % reshape back to user shape before evaluation 
funfcn = funfcn_x_xdata; % initialize user functions funfcn, which depend only on x 
% Catch any error in user objective during initial evaluation only 
switch funfcn_x_xdata{1} 
    case 'fun' 
        try 
            initVals.F = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{3},xCurrent,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
        catch userFcn_ME 
            optim_ME = MException('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUN', ... 
                getString(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUN'))); 
            userFcn_ME = addCause(userFcn_ME,optim_ME); 
            rethrow(userFcn_ME) 
        end 
        initVals.J = []; 
        funfcn{3} = @objective;  
    case 'fungrad' 
        try 
            [initVals.F,initVals.J] = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{3},xCurrent,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
        catch userFcn_ME 
            optim_ME = MException('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUN', ... 
                getString(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUN'))); 
            userFcn_ME = addCause(userFcn_ME,optim_ME); 
            rethrow(userFcn_ME) 
        end 
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        funfcn{3} = @objectiveAndJacobian; 
        funfcn{4} = @objectiveAndJacobian; 
    case 'fun_then_grad' 
        try 
            initVals.F = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{3},xCurrent,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
        catch userFcn_ME 
            optim_ME = MException('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUN', ... 
                getString(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUN'))); 
            userFcn_ME = addCause(userFcn_ME,optim_ME); 
            rethrow(userFcn_ME) 
        end 
        try     
            initVals.J = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{4},xCurrent,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
        catch userFcn_ME 
            optim_ME = MException('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUNJac', ... 
                getString(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:InvalidFUNJac'))); 
            userFcn_ME = addCause(userFcn_ME,optim_ME); 
            rethrow(userFcn_ME) 
        end 
        funfcn{3} = @objective; 
        funfcn{4} = @jacobian; 
    otherwise 
        error(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:UndefCallType')) 
end 
 
if ~isequal(size(initVals.F),size(YDATA)) 
    error(message('optimlib:lsqcurvefit:YdataSizeMismatchFunVal')) 
end 
initVals.F = initVals.F - YDATA; % preserve initVals.F shape until after subtracting YDATA 
 
% Pass functions that depend only on x: funfcn and jacobmult 
[xCurrent,Resnorm,FVAL,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT,LAMBDA,JACOB] = ... 
    lsqncommon(funfcn,xCurrent,lb,ub,options,defaultopt,caller,... 
    initVals,sizes,flags,@jacobmult,varargin{:});  
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
% Nested functions that depend only on x and capture the constant values 
% xdata and ydata, and also varargin 
     function F = objective(x,varargin) 
         F = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{3},x,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
         F = F - YDATA; 
     end 
     function [F,J] = objectiveAndJacobian(x,varargin) 
         % Function value and Jacobian returned together 
         [F,J] = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{3},x,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
         F = F - YDATA; 
 61 
     end 
     function J = jacobian(x,varargin) 
         % Jacobian returned in separate function 
         J = feval(funfcn_x_xdata{4},x,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
     end 
     function W = jacobmult(Jinfo,Y,flag,varargin) 
         W = feval(mtxmpy_xdata,Jinfo,Y,flag,XDATA,varargin{:}); 
     end 
 end 
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The following is the code for Matlab’s “integral.m” program, which was used for numerical 
evaluation of integrals via Gaussian quadrature, as described on page 23 above. Comment lines 
begin with “%”. 
 
function Q = integral(fun,a,b,varargin) 
%INTEGRAL  Numerically evaluate integral. 
%   Q = INTEGRAL(FUN,A,B) approximates the integral of function FUN from A 
%   to B using global adaptive quadrature and default error tolerances. 
% 
%   FUN must be a function handle. A and B can be -Inf or Inf. If both are 
%   finite, they can be complex. If at least one is complex, INTEGRAL 
%   approximates the path integral from A to B over a straight line path. 
% 
%   For scalar-valued problems the function Y = FUN(X) must accept a vector 
%   argument X and return a vector result Y, the integrand function 
%   evaluated at each element of X. For array-valued problems (see the 
%   'ArrayValued' option below) FUN must accept a scalar and return an 
%   array of values. 
% 
%   Q = INTEGRAL(FUN,A,B,PARAM1,VAL1,PARAM2,VAL2,...) performs the 
%   integration with specified values of optional parameters. The available 
%   parameters are 
% 
%   'AbsTol', absolute error tolerance 
%   'RelTol', relative error tolerance 
% 
%       INTEGRAL attempts to satisfy |Q - I| <= max(AbsTol,RelTol*|Q|), 
%       where I denotes the exact value of the integral. Usually RelTol 
%       determines the accuracy of the integration. However, if |Q| is 
%       sufficiently small, AbsTol determines the accuracy of the 
%       integration, instead. The default value of AbsTol is 1.e-10, and 
%       the default value of RelTol is 1.e-6. Single precision integrations 
%       may require larger tolerances. 
% 
%   'ArrayValued', FUN is an array-valued function when the input is scalar 
% 
%       When 'ArrayValued' is true, FUN is only called with scalar X, and 
%       if FUN returns an array, INTEGRAL computes a corresponding array of 
%       outputs Q. The default value is false. 
% 
%   'Waypoints', vector of integration waypoints 
% 
%       If FUN(X) has discontinuities in the interval of integration, the 
%       locations should be supplied as a 'Waypoints' vector. Waypoints 
%       should not be used for singularities in FUN(X). Instead, split the 
%       interval and add the results from separate integrations with 
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%       singularities at the endpoints. If A, B, or any entry of the 
%       waypoints vector is complex, the integration is performed over a 
%       sequence of straight line paths in the complex plane, from A to the 
%       first waypoint, from the first waypoint to the second, and so 
%       forth, and finally from the last waypoint to B. 
% 
%   Examples: 
%       % Integrate f(x) = exp(-x^2)*log(x)^2 from 0 to infinity: 
%       f = @(x) exp(-x.^2).*log(x).^2 
%       Q = integral(f,0,Inf) 
% 
%       % To use a parameter in the integrand: 
%       f = @(x,c) 1./(x.^3-2*x-c) 
%       Q = integral(@(x)f(x,5),0,2) 
% 
%       % Specify tolerances: 
%       Q = integral(@(x)log(x),0,1,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-3) 
% 
%       % Integrate f(z) = 1/(2z-1) in the complex plane over the 
%       % triangular path from 0 to 1+1i to 1-1i to 0: 
%       Q = integral(@(z)1./(2*z-1),0,0,'Waypoints',[1+1i,1-1i]) 
% 
%       % Integrate the vector-valued function sin((1:5)*x) from 0 to 1: 
%       Q = integral(@(x)sin((1:5)*x),0,1,'ArrayValued',true) 
% 
%   Class support for inputs A, B, and the output of FUN: 
%      float: double, single 
% 
%   See also INTEGRAL2, INTEGRAL3, FUNCTION_HANDLE 
 
%   Portions based on "quadva" by Lawrence F. Shampine. 
%   Ref: L.F. Shampine, "Vectorized Adaptive Quadrature in Matlab", 
%   Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 211, 2008, pp.131-140 
 
%   Copyright 2007-2011 The MathWorks, Inc. 
%   $Revision: 1.1.6.2 $  $Date: 2011/11/13 04:01:00 $ 
 
% Validate the first three inputs. 
narginchk(3,inf); 
if ~isa(fun,'function_handle') 
    error(message('MATLAB:integral:funArgNotHandle')); 
end 
if ~(isscalar(a) && isfloat(a) && isscalar(b) && isfloat(b)) 
    error(message('MATLAB:integral:invalidEndpoint')); 
end 
opstruct = integralParseArgs(varargin{:});  
 64 
Q = integralCalc(fun,a,b,opstruct); 
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